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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
be contrary to the well settled precedent established by the cases
interpreting the commerce clause.6
J. A. S.
LABOR DISPUTE-APPLICABILITY oF NORmS-LAGUARwDA ACT
WHEN ANTI-TRUST AcT Is INVoLvED.-Plaintiffs 1 sought to enjoin
the defendants 2 from attempting to unionize the employees of the
plaintiff dairies including certain independent-contractor drivers
known as "vendors" 3 and also from picketing certain cut-rate stores
which purchased milk from the plaintiff dairies. It was contended
by the plaintiffs that the controversy was not a labor dispute, but
that defendants' acts constituted an unlawful secondary boycott for
the purpose of obtaining for the defendants' employers a milk
monopoly contrary to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Held, the con-
troversy arose out of a "labor dispute" involving associations of em-
ployees and employers, all of whom are engaged in the milk industry,
and the picketing constituted an effort to compel the "vendors" and
drivers of the plaintiff dairies to join the defendant union. As a
"labor dispute" was involved, notwithstanding the alleged violations
of the Sherman Act, compliance with the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
deemed a prerequisite to injunctive relief. Since th requirements
of that Act had not been met here, the Court did not have jurisdic-
tion to grant an injunction. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, etc. v.
Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., et al., 310 U. S. 91, 61 Sup. Ct.
122 (1940).
The lower court found that the defendants had attempted for
some time to unionize the employees of the plaintiff and other cut-
6 Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434 (1879) (an ordinance of Baltimore, which
required vessels laden with the products of other states to pay for the use of
the public wharfs of that city, is in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States) ; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 (1880) ; Robbins v. Shelby County,
120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. ,Ct. 592 (1886) ; Baldwin, Commissioner of Agriculture &
Markets, et al. v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 55 Sup. Ct. 497 (1935)
("The state statute must not be discriminatory, and it must not conflict with any
regulation of commerce enacted by Congress") ; Hale, et at. v. Bimco Trading,
Inc., et at., 306 U. S. 375, 59 Sup. Ct. 526 (1939) (a Florida statute, requiring
inspection and imposing an inspection fee of fifteen cents per hundredweight on
cement imported from abroad, held invalid under the commerce clause of the
Constitution where same fee was not imposed on domestic cement).
I There are four plaintiffs: one was the Chicago local of a C. I. 0. union,
the Amalgamated Dairy Workers; two were Chicago dairies whose milk was
processed and distributed by members of the C. I. 0. union; the fourth was a
Wisconsin cooperative association which supplied milk to the plaintiff dairies.
2 The defendants were the Chicago local of the A. F. of L. Milk Wagon
Drivers Union, and its officials.
3 These "vendors" buy milk from the plaintiff dairies and resell it at whole-
sale to retail stores. The dairy takes back any unsold milk at full purchase
price. They are practically employees of the dairies.
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rate dairies, and that the picketing was an effort to compel the
"vendors" and employees of the plaintiff dairies to join the defendant
union for the purpose of improving working conditions and raising
wages, which were lower than the union scale. Such a controversy
between an association of employees and employers engaged in the
same industry or trade is expressly termed a "labor dispute" by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.4  Nor does the controversy cease to be a
"labor dispute" because the employees of the plaintiff dairies became
organized as members of an independent union. A controversy be-
tween associations of employees 5 concerning the "representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange'terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether
or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee",0 is specifically included within the Norris-Laguardia Act.7
The policy of the Act contemplates effective organization of labor
without injunctional interference. If this entails competition between
unions to eliminate the possibilities of corruption and inertia, such
organizational activities should fall under the protection of the statute.8
Having concluded that a "labor dispute" did exist and that the
requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were not met, there still
remained the contention that jurisdiction to grant an injunction ex-
isted, nevertheless, by virtue of the alleged violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act.9 The underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
was to restore the broad purpose which Congress thought it had for-
mulated in the Clayton Act, but which was frustrated by unduly
restrictive judicial construction.10 Congress attempted to reassert the
original purpose of the Clayton Act by expressly extending the pro-
hibitions respecting the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal courts."1
To hold in the face of this legislation and its historical background
447 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 113(a) (1932).
See Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857(1936); Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578 (1938); New
Negro Alliance, et at. v. Sanitary Grocery Co., Inc., 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct.
703 (1938).
547 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 113(a) (1932).
047 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 113(c) (1932).
7 The court should not deny the existence of a "labor dispute" merely
because of its sympathy for an employer caught in a struggle between two com-
peting unions. See Cupples Co. v. Am. Fed. of Labor, et a[., 20 F. Supp. 894
(E. D. Mo. 1937); Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E.
63 (1932).
s International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al. v. International Union of
United Brewery Workers, et al., 106 F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
9 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7 (1890).
20 H. R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 3.
1147 STAT. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. § 105 (1932). See New Negro Alliance
v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703 (1938) ; United States
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, - U. S. -, - Sup. Ct. -
(1941); Donnelly Garment Co. v. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers Union, 99 F.(2d) 309 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Diamond Full Fashioned Hose v. Leader, 20
F. Supp. 467 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
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that the federal courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctions in cases
growing out of labor disputes, merely because alleged violations of the
Sherman Act are involved, would" run counter to the plain mandate
of the Act and would reverse the declared purpose of Congress.
12
As a result of this case and the Apex Hosieiy v. Leader case 13
the federal courts, it would seem, cannot any longer base their juris-
diction in labor cases on the Sherman Act alone. It must appear that
a tort has been committed and that there is a diversity of citizenship
-and even then an injunction may not issue, unless the requirements
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act have been met.
A.A.
LABOR LAW-POWER OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD--
REIMBURSEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES.-The National La-
bor Relations Board, upon finding that the petitioner had engaged in
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(1-3) of the National
Labor Relations Act,' ordered the petitioner, among other things, to
desist from these practices and to reinstate wth backpay certain em-
ployees found to have been discriminatorily discharged for exercising
the rights guaranteed to them under Section 7 2 of the National Labor
Relations Act. In the provision for back pay, the board directed the
company to deduct from the payments to the reinstated employees
the amounts they had received for work performed upon work relief
projects and to pay over such amounts to the proper governmental
agencies which supplied the funds for the work relief projects. Ex-
cept for a minor moffification not important to the immediate consid-
eration the Circuit Court of Appeals 3 affirmed the board's order.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, two jus-
12 Instant case, 311 U. S. at 101, 61 Sup. Ct. at 128. But see Levering v.
Garrigues Co., 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); United Electric Coal Co.
v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), cert. denied, 297 U. S. 714, 56 Sup.
Ct. 590 (1936); United States v. Local 807 of International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen & Helpers of America, 1 Labor Cases 671
(S. D. N. Y. 1938).
'3 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982 (1940).
'49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158(1-3) (1940) ("It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer-(1) To interfere with, restrain or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7. (2) To dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it. (3) By discriminating in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encour-
age or discourage membership in any organization").
249 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 157 (1940) ("Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through their representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection").
3 107 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
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